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INTRODUCTION 
Though only a first step towards a final judgment against 
Russia, the 2009 Yukos Interim Awards on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility were the first decisions made against the nation 
in an Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) arbitration.1  Russia 
never formally ratified the ECT, a multilateral treaty 
intended to promote and protect energy-related investments 
 * J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law, 2012.  I would 
like to thank Professor David Sloss for his guidance and feedback throughout 
the research and writing process, and the Santa Clara Law Review Board of  
Editors and its Associates for their diligent work on this Comment. 
 1. Jason Waltrip, Note, The Russian Oil and Gas Industry after Yukos: 
Outlook for Foreign Investment, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 575, 581 
(2008).  The Yukos Arbitration, with over $100 billion in dispute according to 
lawyers for the claimants, is considered the largest international arbitration 
case in history.  See Emmanuel Gaillard et al., Yukos Majority Shareholders 
Win the First Phase of their US$100 Billion Compensation Claims against  
Russia, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP NEWS, available at http://www.shearman 
.com/Yukos-Majority-Shareholders-Win-the-First-Phase-of-their-US100-Billion-
Compensation-Claims-Against-Russia/ (last visited April 2, 2010). 
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worldwide, though it did initially sign the agreement before it 
floundered in the Duma, its legislature, awaiting final entry 
into force.2 The ECT contains a controversial provision that 
authorizes the treaty’s provisional application and enforces 
the substantive provisions of the treaty before its formal 
ratification.3  The Yukos Tribunal faced the issue of how to 
use the ECT’s provisional application clause during a dispute 
raised after Russia nationalized a highly-profitable energy 
company owned by foreign investors, and the investors 
subsequently initiated an arbitration proceeding under the 
ECT’s dispute settlement clause.4 
The Tribunal’s decision confirmed that Russia was bound 
by the terms of the ECT despite the absence of final 
ratification because Russia had the opportunity to register its 
lack of consent to the provisional application and never did 
so; and because the concept of provisional application is not 
fundamentally opposed by Russian national laws.5  This 
decision affected all investors who made energy-related 
investments in Russia prior to its formal withdrawal as a 
party to the ECT on Oct. 19, 2009, and these investors will be 
afforded the ECT’s protection until Oct. 19, 2029.6  The 
Tribunal’s decision fortified prior case law relating to 
provisional application and clearly follows customary 
international law as codified in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.7 
Part I of this Comment presents the background of the 
Energy Charter,8 its provisional application,9 the Yukos 
dispute that initiated the arbitration currently pending,10 and 
the Tribunal’s decision as it relates to provisional 
 2. Matthew Parish and Charles Rosenberg, An Introduction to the Energy 
Charter Treaty, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 191, 191 (2009). 
 3. See id. at 198 n.37. 
 4. Alex M. Niebruegge, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter 
Treaty: The Yukos Arbitration and the Future Place of Provisional Application 
in International Law, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 357 (2007). 
 5. Elliot Glusker, Arbitration Hurdles Facing Foreign Investors in Russia: 
Analysis of Present Issues and Implications, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 595, 615 
(2010). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra Part I.A. 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. See infra Part I.C. 
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application.11  Part II identifies the problems of provisional 
application of the Energy Charter Treaty either in part or in 
whole.12  Part III analyzes the Tribunal’s decision,13 and Part 
IV proposes a solution to the problem of provisional 
application: that treaty drafters include much more specific 
delineations of pre-entry into force obligations for signatory 
countries.14 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. A Summary of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a “multilateral 
treaty that provides a multilateral framework for energy 
cooperation ensuring the liberalization of the energy market 
including western and eastern, formerly communist 
[s]tates.”15  By establishing a legal framework that promotes 
long-term cooperation in the energy sector in accordance with 
the objectives and principles of the European Energy 
Charter,16 it promotes foreign direct investment in the energy 
market by affording to investors and investments the 
protections of international law.17 
The ECT promotes five primary objectives: (1) protection 
and encouragement of foreign energy investments based on 
the extension of national treatment of most-favored nation 
provisions, (2) free trade in energy-related goods based on 
World Trade Organization guidelines, (3) freedom of energy 
transmission, (4) energy efficiency and heightened 
environmental protection, and (5) a mechanism for the 
resolution of investment disputes.18  Despite its range of 
 11. See infra Part I.D. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. Gerhard Hafner, The Energy Charter Treaty, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 593, 599 ( 2009). 
 16. Energy Charter Treaty art. 2, Dec. 17, 1991, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100, 34 
I.L.M. 360 [hereinafter ECT].  The European Energy Charter is a non-binding 
declaration by over fifty European states to promote energy sector cooperation 
after the fall of the USSR.  See also Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy 
Charter Treaty: A Reader’s Guide (2002), available at http://www.encharter.org/ 
fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/ECT_Guide_ENG.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 
2011). 
 17. Parish and Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 191. 
 18. Hafner, supra note 15, at 599. 
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goals, experts consider the ECT’s provisions protecting 
foreign investment to be the cornerstone of the treaty.19  
These provisions divide investment protection into two 
categories: pre-investment, where investments are afforded a 
“ ‘ soft’ regime of ‘best endeavor obligations,’ ”  and post-
investment, where there is a “ ‘hard’ regime . . . with binding 
obligations for the contracting states similar to the 
investment protection provisions of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement . . . .”20 
Parties seeking cooperation on energy between Eastern 
and Western Europe produced the ECT in order to reconcile 
two inconvenient realities: Eastern Europe was energy-rich 
but cash poor and therefore in need of foreign investment to 
extract, market, and transport its products, while Western 
Europe needed to diversify its energy sources and possessed 
the capital to do so.21  But because Eastern Europe was still 
restructuring its economies after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
backers of the ECT considered “quick economic integration of 
energy markets in the former East and West . . . vital to the 
restructuring and reform of the former communist economies 
. . . .”22  Therefore, the ECT contains a clause authorizing its 
“provisional application.”23  Provisional application of a treaty 
occurs when its obligations are imposed on a signatory state 
prior to full ratification by the state government.24 
B. Provisional Application and the ECT 
Conclusion of a treaty has three parts: signature, 
ratification, and entry into force.25  The act of signing a treaty 
does not create a legal duty on the signatory to ratify the 
treaty, nor does it—without something more—create a duty 
to abide by the provisions of the treaty.26  As a general 
 19. Kaj Hober, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, 1 J. 
INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 153, 155 (2010). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 154. 
 22. Ulrich Klaus, The Gate to Arbitration – The Yukos Case the Provisional 
Application of the Energy Charter Treaty in the Russian Federation, 2 
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT  (2005), available at 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=498  (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 23. See ECT, supra note 16, art. 45. 
 24. Hafner, supra note 15, at 594. 
 25. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 357. 
 26. Id. 
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principle of international law, treaties also do not have legal 
effect before their entry into force.27  Provisional application is 
meant to resolve the difficulties that arise as a result of what 
is oftentimes a significant delay between when a treaty is 
signed and when it is ratified by member nations and entered 
into force.28  Though failure to ratify a treaty would normally 
preclude even the discussion of whether a state was bound by 
the obligations of the treaty, the theory of provisional 
application is a work-around solution that mandates 
compliance with treaty terms pre-ratification.29 
Provisional application is a relatively common practice 
for treaties demanding immediate enforcement, such as those 
to provide disaster relief or war support, though it has only 
recently seen use in investment treaties.30  The Vienna 
Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) first 
explicitly addressed the idea of provisional application.31  In 
Article 25 (Provisional Application), the VCLT provided a 
broad background for provisional application, affording treaty 
parties much discretion in its use: 
1. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally 
pending its entry into force if: 
(a) the treaty itself so provides; or 
(b) the negotiation States have in some other 
manner so agreed. 
2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the 
negotiating States have otherwise agreed, the 
provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty 
with respect to a State shall be terminated if that 
State notifies the other States between which the 
treaty is being applied provisionally of its intention 
 27. Id. 
 28. Matthew Belz, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: 
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia and Improving Provisional Application in 
Multilateral Treaties, 22 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 727, 728–29 (2008). 
 29. William Spiegelberger, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
Russia: An Analysis of the Relevant Treaties, Laws, and Cases, 16 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 261, 271 n.48 (2005). 
 30. Belz, supra note 28, at 728.  The author notes that “[n]egotiating states 
typically provide for such application when matters must be urgently dealt with 
or the parties are faced with or act in anticipation of an international crisis and 
need to bypass the time-consuming practice of concluding treaties.”  Id. at 728 
n.7. 
 31. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 355 n.3 
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not to become a party to the treaty.32 
The VCLT refers only to the methods for making the treaty 
applicable and for terminating this application rather than 
delineating the scope of provisional application; “it neither 
implies any restriction of the scope of the treaty nor does it 
define the method through which the provisional application 
is launched except that it differs from that required for the 
entry into force.”33 
Controversially, provisional application of a treaty 
creates a dilemma where treaty obligations are given effect 
prior to a country’s formal ratification or accession to the 
treaty.34  Provisional application of a treaty is generally 
utilized in one of two situations.35  The first scenario involves 
a treaty created in response to some form of international 
crisis, where “immediate and decisive action may be 
necessary to avert catastrophe.”  In this case, ratification 
delays are not acceptable and provisional application works 
as a way around the delay.36 
The second scenario involves a treaty where quick, broad 
participation and enforcement is necessary in order for it to 
be effective.37  In this case, pre-ratification application is 
justified by the fact that some states may want to undertake 
their responsibilities immediately, that those participating in 
the negotiations are certain the treaty will eventually be 
ratified, or that the negotiators are attempting to work 
around other political hurdles.38 
Despite the specifications in the VCLT, provisional 
application remains an amorphous and vague doctrine often 
characterized by ambiguity.39  This ambiguity arises from the 
key consideration of whether provisional application applies 
to the treaty as a whole or is limited to certain provisions in a 
more piece-meal approach.40  Though relatively undefined, 
provisional application “can be best understood as an attempt 
 32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter VCLT]. art. 25, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (1969). 
 33. Hafner, supra note 15, at 594. 
 34. Hober, supra note 19, at 164. 
 35. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 358. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Hober, supra note 19, at 164. 
 39. Hafner, supra note 15, at 594. 
 40. Id. at 595. 
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to solve the collective action problem created by the gap 
between signature and entry into force of an international 
treaty.”41  Provisional application solves the problem of a 
country capturing treaty benefits at the time of signing 
without incurring the obligations that accompany 
ratification.42  By forcing signatory parties to face the costs 
and ramifications of treaty obligations immediately upon 
signature, provisional application is an incentive for a 
country to ratify the treaty in full without delay.43 
As in most treaties that utilize provisional application, 
the ECT expands on the language of the VCLT with an entire 
article discussing the scope of its provisional application.44  
However, the ECT still does not address the scope of the 
provisional application, beyond allowing states an opt-out 
clause if the treaty is in conflict with national law.45  Article 
45 of the ECT, the section containing the guidelines for 
provisional application, begins by providing that: 
(1) Each signatory agrees to apply this Treaty 
provisionally pending its entry into force for such 
signatory in accordance with Article 44, to the extent that 
such provisional application is not inconsistent with its 
constitution, laws or regulations.46 
In brief, Article 45(1) applies the treaty provisionally so 
long as application is not inconsistent with the laws, 
constitution, or regulations of the country; however, much 
uncertainty lies within this section of the ECT.47  Pursuant to 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of 
Treaties,48 the first step in determining the meaning of an 
article is to look at its ordinary meaning.  Under this method, 
the language “to the extent” operates ipso jure:49 
[Plain meaning] can result in a partial provisional 
application of the ECT, namely to the extent the 
provisions of the ECT are not inconsistent with the 
signatory’s constitution, laws, or regulations. This ipso 
 41. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 355. 
 42. Id. at 359. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Hafner, supra note 15, at 597. 
 45. Id. 
 46. ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(1). 
 47. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 360. 
 48. VCLT, supra note 32, art. 31. 
 49. Hafner, supra note 15, at 601. 
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jure effect is also confirmed by practice: the United 
Kingdom recognized that, due to the ‘to the extent clause’ 
of Article 45(1) ECT, the Russian Federation was obliged 
to apply the ECT provisionally only to the extent that such 
provisional application was not inconsistent with its 
constitution, laws, or regulations.50 
Two interpretations of the language of 45(1) have 
evolved.51  One approach applies the ECT provisionally only if 
the national laws of the signatory state allow provisional 
application of international treaties and these national laws 
have been followed.52  In this case, only the legal concept of 
provisional application must be compatible with national law, 
rather than every term of the ECT.53  So long as national laws 
are compatible with provisional application of the terms of 
the treaty, no further inquiry is necessary to determine 
whether the treaty’s other articles are in agreement with 
national laws.54 
That is not the case with the second approach to the 
interpretation of Article 45(1), which requires not only that 
national laws of the signatory state allow the provisional 
application of the treaty, but that the treaty’s terms comport 
with national laws before the treaty can be provisionally 
applied.55  According to one scholar, this second approach 
seems more likely correct because the purpose “of a limitation 
in provisional application, as in Article 45(1) of the ECT, is to 
avoid possible internal conflicts between the treaty’s 
provisions and national regulations during a transitional 
period.”56 
The controversy stemming from Article 45(1)’s 
provisional application of treaty terms is whether it deems 
parliamentary ratification useless; if a signatory state must 
comply with a treaty’s terms after signing, why go through 
the lengthy and formal process of ratification?57  The tribunal 
 50. Id. 
 51. Klaus, supra note 22. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Hafner, supra note 15, at 601. 
 55. Klaus, supra note 22. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Noah Rubins and Azizjon Nazarov, Investment Treaties and the 
Russian Federation: Baiting the Bear?, 9 BUS. L. INT’L 100, 111 (2008). 
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in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan58 gave minor consideration to this 
issue,59 holding that “Article 45(1) of the ECT meant that the 
signature document . . . was already sufficient for the treaty 
to enter into effect . . . and that this accession remained in 
force indefinitely.”60 
Article 45(2) allows a signatory to opt out of provisional 
application by notifying other signatory countries.61 By 
exercising this right, a country and its investors may not 
claim the benefits of provisional application:62 
2(a) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) any signatory may, 
when signing, deliver to the Depositary a declaration that 
it is not able to accept provisional application.  The 
obligation contained in paragraph (1) shall not apply to a 
signatory making such a declaration.  Any such signatory 
may at any time withdraw that declaration by written 
notification to the Depository. 
(b) Neither a signatory which makes a declaration in 
accordance with subparagraph (a) nor Investors of that 
signatory may claim the benefits of provisional application 
under paragraph (1). 
(c) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a), any signatory 
making a declaration referred to in subparagraph (a) shall 
apply Part VII provisionally pending the entry into force 
of the Treaty for such signatory in accordance with Article 
44, to the extent that such provisional application is not 
inconsistent with its laws or regulations.63 
This approach differs strongly from that of 45(1) because 
“[p]ursuant to this provision, any signatory State may declare 
that it does not accept the provisional application of the ECT.  
 58. Petrobart Ltd. v. The Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitral Award of the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, SCC Case No. 
126/2003 (March 29, 2005) [hereinafter Petrobart Award].  A tribunal is a court 
with special jurisdiction generally based on multilateral agreements and with 
the purpose of hearing claims often relating to international issues.  See, e.g., 
Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and 
Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U J. INT’L L. & POL. 679 (1999). 
 59. Rubins and Nazarov, supra note 57, at 111 (“The claimant in the case 
was a company created under the laws of Gibraltar, which initiated . . . 
arbitration against Kyrgyzstan under the ECT in relation to gas supplies in 
Central Asia.”). 
 60. Id.; see also Petrobart Award, supra note 58. 
 61. ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(2). 
 62. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 360. 
 63. ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(2). 
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The expression ‘may’ expresses a right or option that can be 
exercised, but does not impose any obligation on the State.”64 
Whereas Article 45(1) passively obliges the nation upon 
signing, without necessitating further action, a nation must 
actively exercise Article 45(2) before it takes effect.65  Article 
45(2) was designed specifically to allow a signatory nation 
explicitly to reject provisional application and thereby excuse 
itself from the obligation incurred in Article 45(1).66  Though 
several signatory states utilized this opt-out provision, the 
Russian Federation was not one of them.67  By July 2006, only 
five countries—Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Norway, and the 
Russian Federation—had yet to ratify the ECT, and of those 
five, Australia, Iceland, and Norway all exercised the opt-out 
provision in Article 45(2).68  Clearly, Articles 45(1) and  
45(2) represent two different approaches to provisional 
application.69 
Even if a nation accepts provisional application of the 
treaty, Article 45(3) gives that signatory the right to 
terminate provisional application at any time.  However, 
despite terminating application of the treaty, the signatory 
must continue to abide by the provisions of the ECT relating 
to investment promotion and protection and dispute 
settlement for the twenty years following termination.70  The 
text of 45(3) reads: 
(3)(a) Any signatory may terminate its provisional 
application of this Treaty by written notification to the 
Depositary of its intention not to become a Contracting 
Party to the Treaty.  Termination of provisional 
application for any signatory shall take effect upon the 
expiration of 60 days from the date on which such 
signatory’s written notification is received by the 
Depositary. 
(b) In the event that a signatory terminates provisional 
application under subparagraph (a), the obligation of the 
 64. Hafner, supra note 15, at 601. 
 65. ECT, supra note 16, arts. 45(1), 45(2). 
 66. Hafner, supra note 15, at 602. 
 67. Frederik Erixon, European Center for International Political Economy 
Policy Brief 7 1, 10 (2008), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/ 
download?doi=10.1.1.172.1403&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 68. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 360. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.; see also ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(3). 
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signatory under paragraph (1) to apply Parts III and V 
with respect to any Investments made in its Area during 
such provisional application by Investors of other 
signatories shall nevertheless remain in effect with 
respect to those Investments for twenty years following 
the effective date of termination, except as otherwise 
provided in subparagraph (c).71 
Provisional application ends under Article 45(3)(a) when the 
signatory state submits written notification of its desire not to 
become a party to the treaty.72  Until then, Article 45(3)(b) 
bestows a range of benefits to investors and investments.73  
Despite a signatory’s notification that it intends to terminate 
its application of the ECT, the terminating signatory must 
still apply Part III (Promotion and Protection of Investment) 
and Part V (Dispute Settlement) of the ECT to investments 
made prior to termination for twenty years following the date 
of termination.74  This provision implies that the treaty as a 
whole applies provisionally for an indefinite period of time 
unless terminated by the signatory, in which case certain 
provisions relating to protection of prior investments remain 
in effect for twenty years.75 
The inclusion of Article 45 in the ECT triggered 
provisional application of its rules by all signatory parties in 
December 1994 until the ECT’s entry into force in April 1998, 
unless a signatory state explicitly rejected provisional 
application.76  After the treaty’s entry into force in April 1998, 
it still required provisional application to signatory states 
that had not yet ratified it.77  Russia was one of these states.  
Having initiated the ratification process in 1996 with the 
ECT’s introduction to the State Duma and Parliamentary 
hearings in 1998, the Duma continually postponed 
ratification due to concerns about certain provisions of the 
treaty.78 
Because it initially signed the ECT, “Russia and the 
other signatories . . . agreed to apply [the ECT] provisionally 
 71. ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(3). 
 72. Erixon, supra note 67, at 12. 
 73. ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(3)(b). 
 74. Erixon, supra note 67, at 12. 
 75. Id.  This is the main focus of the Yukos Tribunal.  See infra Part III. 
 76. Hober, supra note 19, at 166. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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pending its entry into force . . . to the extent that such 
provisional application [was] not inconsistent with its 
constitution, laws or regulations.”79  Russia did not enter a 
declaration of non-application under ECT Article 45(2), 
therefore the treaty required Russia to accept its application 
on a provisional basis.80 
C. The Yukos Dispute 
The Yukos Arbitration, the largest arbitration in history 
based on amount of money in controversy and a case at least 
initially centering on the issue of provisional application of 
the ECT,81 has its roots in the organization of the Yukos Oil 
Company in 1993 under the laws of the Russian Federation.82  
Yukos was a joint stock corporation that had been publicly-
traded since the privatization of state-owned energy 
companies after the fall of the USSR.83  The Russian 
Federation, initially the sole shareholder in Yukos, sold its 
holdings in 1995 and 1996 to stave off a debt crisis.84  A group 
of investors headed by Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon 
Lebedev, Russian citizens, purchased approximately fifty-one 
percent of the stock through a Gibraltar-based holding 
company called Menatep.85  The privatization of Yukos was 
just one part of a massive effort towards de-nationalization 
led by Boris Yeltsin in the hope of creating a more Western-
style, free-market economy.86  Privatization resulted in the 
rise of oligarchs like Khodorkovsky, who led Yukos to the 
position of top oil producer in Russia.87  For ten years, leaders 
of the highly-profitable Yukos wielded significant economic 
and political power88 due to Yukos’ quick growth into  
 79. Spiegelberger, supra note 29, at 271 n.48 (internal citations omitted). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See, e.g., Belz, supra note 28, at 727. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 362. 
 84. Id. at 363.  See also Waltrip, supra note 1, at 581 (noting that 
Khodorkovsky initially loaned the Russian government over $300 million and 
then acquired control when the Russian government defaulted on the loan). 
 85. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 363. 
 86. Brenden Marino Carbonell, Comment, Cornering the Kremlin: 
Defending Yukos and TNK-BP from Strategic Expropriation by the Russian 
State, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 257, 261 (2009). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 363. 
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a multinational corporation.89 Yukos’ highest levels of 
production made it one of the world’s largest private oil 
companies in terms of reserves and market capitalization.90  
In 2003, it boasted over 600 subsidiaries, an average daily 
output of more than 1.6 million barrels of oil, $2 billion in 
distributed dividends, and $18 billion in assets.91  Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky, Yukos’ chairman, was considered Russia’s 
richest man.92 
After Vladimir Putin became president of Russia in 1999, 
he made his feelings toward the private powerful energy 
companies clear; these feelings were expressed by his deputy 
head of the Presidential Administration, Vladislav Surkov, 
who commented that “[the new administration] will not allow 
a small group of companies to be the power in the country 
where they permeate the state apparatus.”93  President Putin 
viewed energy resources as “an opportunity for Russia to 
recover economically and re-emerge on the geopolitical stage 
as a superpower.  The oil and natural gas should further the 
revitalization of the entire country.”94 
The Putin administration exerted great control over 
Russia’s energy sector, enforcing a stiff period of regulation 
that marked a “stark contrast to the free-wheeling laissez-
faire attitude characteristic of the Yeltsin years.”95  Beginning 
in 2003, Putin’s administration sought to achieve this goal of 
returning major energy sector companies to state control  
by harassing those involved with Yukos.96  In July, the 
government arrested Lebedev, the president of Menatep, on 
charges of illegally acquiring an investment in a state- 
owned fertilizer company.  “Over the next month, Russian 
 89. Matteo Winkler, Arbitration Without Privity and Russian Oil: The 
Yukos Case Before the Houston Court, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 115, 115 
(2006). 
 90. Waltrip, supra note 1, at 582. 
 91. Winkler, supra note 89, at 116. 
 92. Elliot Glusker, Arbitration Hurdles Facing Foreign Investors in Russia: 
Analysis of Present Issues and Implications, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 595, 611 
(2010). 
 93. Phillip Hanson, Observations on the Costs of the Yukos Affair to Russia, 
46 EURASIAN GEOG. & ECON. 481, 483 (2005) (cited in Carbonell, supra note 86, 
at 259). 
 94. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 263. 
 95. Id. at 280. 
 96. Catherine Belton, The Arrest that Proved a Turning Point, Moscow 
Times 1 (Oct. 25, 2006) (cited in Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 363). 
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authorities continued to arrest a number of former and 
current employees of Menatep, Yukos, and subsidiaries.”97  In 
October, authorities arrested Khodorkovsky for fraud and tax 
evasion, charges that were widely believed to stem from 
Khodorkovsky’s support of Putin’s political rivals, and from 
the possibility that Exxon Mobil had interest in buying a 
holding in Yukos from Menatep.98 
The Russian government also confronted Yukos about tax 
deficiencies99 that were seen as largely politically 
motivated.100  The Russian Ministry of Finance in December 
2003 made a series of tax assessments that would eventually 
total $27.5 billion, based on purportedly deficient tax 
payments from 2000 to 2004.101  Authorities froze over five 
billion dollars of assets held by several principal Yukos 
investors,102 and in November 2004, the bailiffs of the 
Ministry of Justice announced an auction of Yukos’ primary 
production arm, Yuganskneftegaz (YNG), responsible for over 
sixty percent of Yukos’ oil production.103  The Ministry of 
Justice announced that it was only seeking half of the actual 
market price for YNG.104 
In order to halt the YNG auction, the managers of Yukos 
filed a bankruptcy action in Houston, Texas.105  United States 
bankruptcy laws, among the most debtor-favorable in the 
world, gave jurisdiction to companies with worldwide assets 
and could prevent creditors from appropriating those 
assets.106  Though the judge initially granted an injunction 
forbidding various corporate entities and “those persons in 
active concert or participation with them”107 from 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Glusker, supra note 92, at 611. 
 101. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 363. 
 102. Waltrip, supra note 1, at 582–83. 
 103. Winkler, supra note 89, at 117. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 267. 
 106. Dmitry Golobolov and Joseph Tanega, Yukos Risk, the Double-Edged 
Sword: A Case Note on International Bankruptcy Litigation and the 
Transnational Limits of Corporate Governance, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 557, 582 
(2006). 
 107. Yukos Oil Co. v. Russian Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130, 
138 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004); see also Golobolov and Tanega, supra note 106, at 
596 (“Judge Clark entered a TRO enjoining certain entities from taking any 
actions with respect to YNG stock, including participating in the auction.”).  
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participating in the sale, the auction nevertheless continued 
as planned, with a previously unknown company called 
Baikalfinansgroup winning the auction and subsequently 
merging with Rosneft, the Russian state-owned energy 
company.108  Baikalfinansgroup, thought to be a front 
company and only recently registered in a grocery shop in a 
small Russian town, paid $9.4 billion for an asset that was 
valued at $60 billion by the London Stock Exchange,109 and 
between $14.7 billion and $21.1 billion by private 
financiers.110 
Because it appeared that the entire auction was a blatant 
attempt by the Russian government to regain control over 
Yukos, there was much international criticism of the sale.111  
Fueling this criticism is the fact that after acquisition by 
Rosneft, the tax claims against YNG were reduced by nearly 
$4 billion;112 “these events strengthen the perception that the 
actions against Yukos were not an issue of legitimate tax 
liability, but rather part of a plan by the Russian government 
to consolidate control over the energy sector.”113 
Yukos continued to seek protection under the bankruptcy 
laws of the United States,114 but the court in Texas eventually 
granted Russia’s motion to dismiss the case based on the 
totality of the circumstances, including Yukos’ inability to 
reorganize without the cooperation of the Russian 
government; the fact that it had only recently begun to hold 
Those entities included the three Russian companies registered to bid at the 
auction and the six banks that had announced interest in funding a purchaser’s 
bid.  Id. 
 108. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 267; see also Erin E. Arvedlund and Steven 
Lee Meyers, An All-but-Unknown Company Wins a Rich Russian Oil Stake, NY 
TIMES A1 (Dec. 20, 2004) (“The mystery surrounding the winner -- a company 
called the Baikal Finans Group that is registered in Tver, a medium-size city 
170 miles northwest of Moscow -- immediately raised suspicion among industry 
analysts” and an analyst commented after the auction ended that “the surprise 
winning bidder, Baikal Finans Group, is either a front for Gazprom or a state-
friendly company . . . [or] a combination of state and state-friendly interests.”). 
 109. The Economist, “After Yukos: The Far-Reaching Legacy of the Yukos 
Affair,” May 10, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/node/9167397. 
 110. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 365. 
 111. Golobolov and Tanega, supra note 106, at 603–04 (noting that the sale 
was “mysterious” and undermined confidence in investing in Russia). 
 112. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 365. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 267.  See also Winkler, supra note 89, at 
119–21. 
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assets in the United States and initiated proceedings in 
multiple fora; the complexity of applying numerous foreign 
statutes involved in such a complex situation; lack of personal 
jurisdiction over most foreign officials involved; and the 
necessity of cooperation by the Russian government to 
successfully adjudicate the matter, which did not seem 
forthcoming.115 
Seeking to find remuneration for an asset assertedly 
expropriated by the Russian government, Menatep’s major 
subsidiaries sent notice to Russia on November 2, 2004 that 
triggered the ECT’s mandatory three-month conciliation 
period.116  Once the conciliation period ended, the subsidiaries 
filed a notice of arbitration with Russia, filing a $28.3 billion 
claim for compensation due as a consequence for the actions 
taken by the Russian government.117  The arbitration 
proceeded under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and was 
supervised by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague.118  Menatep’s primary claim was that Russia’s actions 
against Yukos, especially the forced sale of YNG, were 
tantamount to expropriation.119  The threshold issue for the 
panel of arbitrators to decide was whether Russia was 
required to abide by the provisions of the ECT as a whole.120  
The issue was the subject of two rounds of written pleadings 
and a hearing in The Hague in 2008, and the tribunal came to 
a decision near the end of 2009.121  Because only a brief 
summary of the decision was initially released, there was 
much speculation about the substance of the award, the first 
ECT award against Russia.122 
 
 115. Carbonell, supra note 86, at 267.  See also Winkler, supra note 89, at 
119–21. 
 116. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 365; see also ECT, supra note 16, art. 26(3). 
 117. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 365–66. 
 118. Id. at 366; see also International Institute for Sustainable Development, 
Investment Treaty News 4 (Feb. 22, 2005) available at http://www.iisd.org/ 
pdf/2005/investment_investsd_feb22_2005.pdf. 
 119. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 366. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Alison Ross, Lawyers React to Yukos Awards, 5 GLOBAL ARBITRATION 
REV. 11, 11 (2010). 
 122. Id. 
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D. The Tribunal’s Decision on Provisional Application 
On February 1, 2010, counsel for claimant Menatep 
unilaterally published the entire arbitral decision despite 
Russia’s reluctance toward making the award public.123  
Though the tribunal addressed multiple preliminary issues in 
the arbitration,124 only its decision regarding provisional 
application of the ECT will be addressed in this Comment. 
With regard to whether Article 45 of the ECT required 
that Russia provisionally apply the terms of the treaty to the 
claimants’ investments, the Tribunal used a three-step 
analysis to hold that Russia must protect the investments as 
it would have under the ECT.125  As a preliminary matter, the 
Tribunal noted that the parties agreed to certain facts: first, 
that Russia signed the ECT on December 17, 1994 and that it 
was discussed in parliament but never ratified; second, that 
Russia notified the ECT countries of its intention not to 
become a party on August 20, 2009, effectively terminating its 
provisional application on October 18, 2009; and third, that 
Russia was still bound by ECT 45(3)(b) to give provisional 
application of Parts III and V—the sections relating to 
protection of previous investments—until October 18, 2029 of 
the ECT to any investments made in Russia before the date of 
termination of provisional application.126 
The Tribunal began its analysis by considering whether 
Russia was obligated to prepare a declaration under Article 
45(2) of the ECT in order to make use of Article 45(1), the 
clause of the ECT that proscribes provisional application 
 123. Id. 
 124. See, e.g., id. 
 125. Dr. Chiara Giorgetti, The Yukos Interim Awards on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility Confirms Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty, 14 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHT ISSUE 23 (Aug. 3, 2010). 
 126. Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation, Interim Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 227 (Nov. 30, 2009), available 
at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/YULvRussianFederation-InterimAward-
30Nov2009.pdf; Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation, Interim Award 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 226 (Nov. 30, 2009), 
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/HELvRussianFederation-Interim 
Award-30Nov2009.pdf; Veteran Petroleum Trust v. Russian Federation, Interim 
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA Case No. AA 228 (Nov. 30, 2009), 
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/VPLvRussianFederation-Interim 
Award-30Nov2009.pdf [hereinafter VPT Award].  The Tribunal is hearing these 
three cases together and issued an identical decision for each case.  Id.; see also 
Giorgetti, supra note 125. 
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when it is inconsistent with the constitution, laws, or 
regulations of the signatory state (known as the Limitation 
Clause).127  Article 45(2) states that a signatory may, at the 
time of signing, notify other signatory parties that it is not 
able to accept provisional application.128  The Tribunal agreed 
with Russia that this language did not preclude a state from 
arguing that its laws were against provisional application 
when the state had not submitted a declaration under 
45(2).129 
The Claimants argued that, pursuant to the plain 
meaning of the ECT, Article 45(1) established the principle of 
provisional application and 45(2) established the “procedure 
according to which a signatory State may opt out of the 
concept of provisional application.”130  The Tribunal, however, 
declined to follow this suggestion and instead found that 
Articles 45(1) and 45(2) presented two separate regimes of 
provisional application.131  Article 45(1) applied “only in case 
of inconsistency between the treaty provisions and a 
signatory’s constitution, laws, or regulations,” and did not 
require a declaration.  Section 45(2), on the other hand, 
applied when a state wanted to prevent provisional 
application for political or other reasons, and did require an 
express declaration.132 
The Tribunal made this determination first by using 
Article 31 of the VCLT133 to examine the plain meaning of 
Article 45.134  Though both the Claimant and Respondent 
made arguments based on the plain meaning of the law, the 
Tribunal found that respondent Russia’s approach was more 
faithful to the object and purpose of the ECT.135  In addition, 
six signatory states had already relied on the Limitation 
Clause in Article 45(1) without delivering a formal notice to 
 127. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 244; see also Giorgetti, supra note 
125. 
 128. ECT, supra note 16, art. 45(2). 
 129. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 264. 
 130. Id. at para. 251. 
 131. Id. at para. 250. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 
I.L.M. 679 (1969) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
 134. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 262. 
 135. Id. at para. 263. 
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the ECT governing body as required by Article 45(2).136  
Beyond this evidence of state practice, the Tribunal also 
found support in the recent ICSID arbitration decision in the 
Kardassopoulos case.137  There, the Tribunal noted: 
There is no necessary link between paragraphs (1) and (2) 
of Article 45.  A declaration made under paragraph (2) 
may be, but does not have to be, motivated by an 
inconsistency between provisional application and 
something in the State’s domestic law; there may be other 
reasons which prompt a State to make such a declaration.   
Equally, a State whose situation is characterized by such 
inconsistency is entitled to rely on the proviso to 
paragraph (1) without the need to make, in addition, 
declaration under paragraph (2).  The Tribunal is 
therefore unable to read into the failure of either State to 
make a declaration of the kind referred to in Article 45(2) 
any implication that it therefore acknowledges that there 
is no inconsistency between provisional application and its 
domestic law.138 
Once it had determined that the approaches dictated by 
Articles 45(1) and 45(2) were independent of one another,139 
the Tribunal addressed its next issue regarding provisional 
application: whether Article 45(1), the Limitation Clause, 
required states to inform the other signatories that it could 
not apply the ECT provisionally.140  Both Claimant and 
Respondent agreed that Respondent Russia had not made 
such a declaration or given prior notice, so “an affirmative 
answer to this question would dispose of the Article 45 issue 
in favor of Claimant.”141 
To support its case, Russia pointed to other countries 
that previously relied on the Limitation Clause of Article 
45(1) due to a disagreement between national laws and the 
obligations of provisional application without making a 
formal declaration.142  In response, Claimant argued that 
 136. Id. at para. 265.  The six countries were Austria, Luxembourg, Italy, 
Romania, Portugal, and Turkey.  Id. 
 137. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 228 (July 6, 2007) (quoted in VPT Award, supra note 126, para 
269.). 
 138. Id. 
 139. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 270. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at para. 274.  These countries include Luxembourg, Finland, 
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fundamental principles of international law, transparency 
and reciprocity, necessitated the provision of formal notices of 
legal obstacles to provisional application.143  Additionally, 
Claimant argued that not only had the Russian Federation 
given no notice of inconsistency under Article 45(1), but it had 
also been a firm supporter of the language creating 
provisional application of the ECT during ECT 
negotiations.144 
The Tribunal decided that Russia could—despite “years 
of stalwart and unqualified support for provisional 
application”—invoke the Limitation Clause to claim 
inconsistency between provisional application of the ECT and 
national laws in order to avoid provisional application of the 
investment protection measures of the ECT.145  It based this 
decision on the rules of treaty interpretation found in Articles 
31 and 32 of the VCLT that prevent the creation of “a 
notification requirement which the text does not disclose and 
which no recognized legal principle dictates.”146  The Tribunal 
determined that, although the Russian Federation was 
subject to considerations of estoppel based on its initial 
support for provisional application, the conditions necessary 
for such a finding were not met in this case.147 
After concluding that Russia could rely on the Limitation 
Clause of 45(1) despite neither making a declaration under 
45(2) nor giving prior notice under 45(1),148 the Tribunal 
decided what effect should be given to the Limitation Clause 
of ECT 45(1).149  The Tribunal divided this analysis into two 
steps:150 first, whether Russia was required to provisionally 
apply the ECT in its entirety or whether it could be allowed to 
take a piecemeal approach, and second, whether the general 
principle of provisional application was inconsistent with 
Germany, and France.  Id. 
 143. Id. at para. 275. 
 144. Id. at para. 281. 
 145. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 284. 
 146. Id. at para 283. 
 147. Id. at para. 286–88.  The Tribunal found that “conditions for the 
existence of a situation of estoppels are not met in this case, because . . . 
Claimant, to succeed with its estoppels argument, would need to establish more 
than mere support by the Russian Federation during negotiations of the Treaty 
for the provisional application of the ECT.”  Id. at para. 286. 
 148. Id. at para. 290. 
 149. Id. at para. 289. 
 150. Id. at para. 290. 
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Russian law.151 
Deciding the former question, the Tribunal decided that 
Russia must accept an “all-or-nothing” approach to 
provisional application.  After all, “by signing the ECT, the 
Russian Federation agreed that the Treaty as a whole would 
be applied provisionally pending its entry into force unless the 
principle of provisional application itself [was] inconsistent 
with its constitution, laws, or regulations.”152  This decision is 
considered “especially important . . . [for reinforcing] the 
binding nature of international law.”153  Under the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda, a State would normally be prevented 
from using its national legislation as an excuse for a failure to 
perform.154 
The Tribunal concluded that “allowing a State to 
modulate (or, as the case may be, eliminate) the obligation of 
provisional application, depending on the content of its 
internal law in relation to the specific provisions found in the 
[ECT], would undermine the principle that provisional 
application of a treaty creates binding obligations.”155  This 
rationale reinforces the integrity of international law as 
separate from domestic law by preventing the formation of a 
hybrid law “in which the content of domestic law directly 
controls the content of an international legal obligation.”156 
Having decided that provisional application would, if 
applied at all, be applied in its entirety, the Tribunal turned 
its focus to whether the principle of provisional application 
conflicted with Russian law.157  Claimants argued that the 
relevant Russian law allows “an international treaty or a part 
thereof . . . prior to its entry into force, [to] be applied in  
the Russian Federation provisionally if the treaty so provides 
. . . .”158  Further, at the time of the arbitration, Russia was 
subject to the provisional application of forty-five other 
treaties.159 
 
 151. VPT Award, supra note 126, paras. 290, 330, 346. 
 152. Id. at para. 301 (internal citations omitted). 
 153. Giorgetti, supra note 125. 
 154. Id. 
 155. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 314. 
 156. Id. at para. 315. 
 157. Id. at para. 330. 
 158. Id. at para. 332 (internal citations omitted). 
 159. Id. at para. 337. 
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In summary, the Tribunal’s decision regarding 
provisional application of the ECT began by determining that 
the “regimes of provisional application in Article 45(1) and 
45(2) are separate, and the Russian Federation can benefit 
from the Limitation Clause in Article 45(1) even though it 
made no declaration under 45(2).”160  Next, the Tribunal 
found that Russia could invoke the Limitation Clause despite 
neither making a prior declaration nor giving any prior notice 
to other signatory states that it intended to use Article 45(1) 
to prevent provisional application.161  The Tribunal then 
noted that the Limitation Clause in 45(1) negated provisional 
application of the ECT only if the principle of general 
provisional application of the entire treaty conflicted with the 
constitution, laws, or regulations of the signatory.162  Finally, 
the Tribunal determined that no such conflict existed 
between the laws of the Russian Federation and the principle 
of provisional application of treaties.163  Based on these 
conclusions, the Tribunal determined that the Russian 
Federation was subject to provisional application of the entire 
ECT until October 19, 2009, and of Parts III and V until 
October 19, 2029 for any investments made prior to the date 
of termination of provisional application.164  The Tribunal 
asserted this decision as the basis for its jurisdiction over the 
arbitration, and finally concluded that Russia would be 
precluded from making arguments based on the 
inapplicability of certain ECT provisions.165 
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
The Yukos Tribunal confronted the issue of whether the 
ECT should be provisionally applied when a signatory 
country had made no previous declaration that provisional 
application was at odds with the laws of the country.166  The 
Tribunal decided that non-declaration did not automatically 
mandate provisional application, but also found that Russia’s 
national laws were not opposed to provisional application and 
 160. Id. at para. 394. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at para. 395. 
 165. Id. at para. 397–98. 
 166. See supra Part I.D. 
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therefore Russia was obligated to comport with the terms of 
the treaty until its withdrawal as a signatory state.167  The 
Tribunal’s decision holding Russia to the terms of a treaty 
that it never fully approved raises the issue of whether 
provisional application is appropriate with regards to the 
Energy Charter Treaty and international treaty law 
generally, and Russia’s treatment of foreign investors 
specifically.  Provisional application of a treaty that has not 
yet been fully ratified is a controversial legal maneuver 
because it enforces treaty obligations prior to final state 
approval.168  Because of its relative infancy in the world of 
customary international law, the scope and duration of 
provisional application, as well as the validity of the theory as 
a whole, needs further clarification. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE TRIBUNAL’S PROVISIONAL APPLICATION 
DECISION 
The Tribunal’s decision that the ECT should be applied 
as a whole to investments made in Russia prior to Russia’s 
withdrawal as an ECT signatory sets an important, though 
non-binding, precedent on the treatment of treaties yet to be 
fully ratified that contain provisional application clauses.169  
Though there is no mandatory accord with the precedent of 
past tribunals, arbitral awards often represent a summary of 
the current legal thinking and state of the law.  Therefore, 
the “outcome of the Yukos Arbitration has the potential to 
directly impact not only future arbitration under the ECT 
but, more broadly, the status, characterization, and 
obligations imposed by the provisional application in 
international law.”170  It has been noted that, “it will take 
 167. Id. 
 168. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 370. 
 169. Id. at 371–72 (noting that “the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice does not expressly enumerate private arbitral decisions as a recognized 
source of international law).  Furthermore, Article 32(2) of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules expressly denies an award precedential value by only 
providing that an award is “binding on the parties.”  Id. 
 170. Id. at 372.  See also AES Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/17, Award on Jurisdiction (2005) (cited in Markus Esley, “The Curious 
Case of the 15 Professors - Claims Against Russia Under the Energy Charter 
Treaty,” The Arbiter: International Disputes Newswire (April 2010), available at 
http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/00012511-8e60-469a-ae3d-f2a42b6 
f429f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0dcd6d93-ba64-45e7-a224-f91bb3654 
518/CP_ArbiterNews-0410.pdf (noting that “tribunals do, undoubtedly, read 
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quite a lot of persuasive argument to get other tribunals . . . 
to depart from the decision in the Yukos awards.”171 
As noted by the Tribunal itself, the Award reinforces the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the theory that states must 
abide by their agreements, and of the concept that conflict 
with national law is not an excuse for failure to abide by the 
terms of an international agreement entered into force.172  
Though the Tribunal did stretch this definition of pacta sunt 
servanda by placing obligations on Russia based on a treaty 
not yet entered into force, the Award serves as a notice that 
countries should not idly enter into multilateral agreements 
through which large investments will be made.173  By 
preventing Russia from choosing which parts of the ECT to 
apply provisionally, the Tribunal reinforced the idea that 
provisional application of a treaty creates legally-binding 
obligations.174  If the Tribunal had allowed Russia to escape 
the obligations imposed by provisional application, Russia 
would receive the benefits of investments made in reliance on 
the expectation of the ECT’s protection without having to 
afford any such protection to these investments.175 
The Tribunal’s decision fortifies that of the tribunal in 
Kardassopoulos, where the arbitrators found that the ECT 
should be provisionally applicable as a whole;176 they believed 
that “provisional application imports the application of all the 
treaty’s provisions as if they were already in force, even 
though the treaty’s definitive entry into force had not yet 
occurred.”177  The counsel for Kardassopoulos commented that 
the Yukos decision “underscores the effectiveness of 
provisional application as a device for giving international 
prior awards on similar issues and will not disregard them lightly”)). 
 171. Esley, supra note 170, at 5. 
 172. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 312–15; see also VCLT, supra note 32, 
art. 26 and 27. 
 173. Giorgetti, supra note 125. 
 174. VPT Award, supra note 126, para. 316. 
 175. Id. at para. 313. 
 176. Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 228 (July 6, 2007). 
 177. Hober, supra note 19, at 185.  The author notes that if ‘entry into force’ 
in Article 1(6) of the ECT (the provision regarding the nature of investments) 
were construed strictly and “[meant] only definitive entry into force, it would 
mean that investments during the period of provisional application would be 
excluded from the ECT.  Such a result would strike at the heart of the clearly 
intended provisional application regime.”  Id. 
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treaties immediate and binding effect and confirms that it is 
in no way a watered-down application of the treaty or an 
aspirational exercise.”178 
In addition to enforcing Russia’s compliance with the 
provisions of a treaty that it had provisionally ratified, the 
Yukos tribunal also decreased the risk of defection by other 
countries.179  Because the tribunal portrayed Russia’s 
obligations as binding, affirmative, and not limited in 
scope,180 there is no incentive for more countries in the 
provisional ratification stage to defer from final entry into 
force.181  Beyond specifically deterring other countries from 
abrogation of their treaty duties, the Yukos decision will also 
serve as a foundation for the future discussion of provisional 
application in international law.182  Because global 
multilateral investment treaties are on the rise, provisional 
application could be a key way of achieving investment 
protection prior to the lengthy process of full ratification.183 
The decision also has strong implications for investors in 
the energy sector who can claim the protection of the ECT.  
By holding a major energy-producing country like Russia to 
the terms of the ECT, the tribunal reinforced the rule of law 
and ended Russia’s attempts to portray the ECT as an 
ineffective legal instrument in need of replacement; rather, 
the ECT has become an effective multilateral agreement to 
protect investors in the field of energy.184  Though, as with 
most arbitration decisions, there is little possibility of any 
monetary collection by the claimants due to the bias of 
national court systems tasked with enforcing decisions,185 
collection of a possible award seems more likely in this case 
given the ECT’s allowance of attachment of extraterritorial 
assets to satisfy arbitral decisions.186  The Yukos decision and 
 178. Ross, supra note 121, at 11 (internal citations omitted). 
 179. Id. 
 180. The obligations that the Tribunal places on Russia are naturally limited 
to the investment protection provisions of the ECT.  See supra Part I.D. 
 181. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 374. 
 182. Id. at 375. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Alan Riley, The EU-Russia Energy Relationship: Will the Yukos Decision 
Trigger a Fundamental Reassessment in Moscow?, 2 INT’L ENERGY L. REV. 36, 
37 (2010). 
 185. See Golobolov and Tanega, supra note 106, at 647. 
 186. Riley, supra note 184, at 37; see also Franz Sedelmayer v. Russian 
Federation, IIC 106 (1998) (allowing an arbitral decision against Russia to be 
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its application of the investment protection terms of the ECT 
furthers the purpose of the ECT—promoting and insulating 
investments in the energy sector.187 
Russia’s withdrawal as a signatory of the ECT, and the 
Yukos tribunal’s subsequent decision that Russia will be 
bound by the investment protection sections of the ECT for 
the next twenty years, possibly places on Russia the burden 
of affording protection to past investors without the 
accompanying influx of new investments.188  This comes at a 
particularly bad time for the Russian energy sector as 
analysts have predicted nearly half a trillion dollars of 
energy-related investments as necessary by 2020 to sustain 
Russia’s energy-producing infrastructure.189  In sum, Russia 
will have to afford customary international law standards to 
investments made in its oil industry without receiving the 
benefits derived from an adherence to international norms, 
such as heightened investor confidence and lower political 
risk.190 
Some have criticized the awards for giving the protection 
of the ECT to an investment of foreign companies as 
customary under the treaty, and notably, an investment of a 
company primarily owned by wealthy Russians.191  Following 
this decision, Russian nationals making energy investments 
in Russia would be protected if they made the investment 
through a shell company incorporated in an alternate 
jurisdiction, but not if they made the investment directly.192  
This may be true, but the same could be said of any 
multilateral or bilateral investment protection treaty that 
affords protection to foreigners making in-state 
investments.193 
Notably, applying the provisions of the treaty as a whole 
places a large burden on potential claimants; before bringing 
enforced through the attachment of extraterritorial Russian-owned property). 
 187. Riley, supra note 184, at 37–38. 
 188. Id. at 38. 
 189. Id. (noting that internal capital cannot come close to covering the 
needed infrastructure investments and that Russia will therefore have to rely 
on international funding, a source that it cannot guarantee after the lessons 
that investors learned from the Yukos dispute). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Ross, supra note 121, at 12. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
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a case to arbitration, a prudent investor needs to ensure the 
entire treaty’s consistency with the domestic regulations 
regarding provisional application of treaties, as well as the 
host nation’s domestic laws in general.194  Confusingly, this 
would place the burden of proof on the investor, rather than 
the state, to show that the treaty may be applied 
provisionally despite the explicit authorization of provisional 
application found in the text of the ECT.195  The 
Kardassopoulos and subsequent Yukos decisions may 
“[reduce] investor confidence in the ECT” due to this switch of 
the burden of proof.196  Importantly, though, the provisional 
application of the treaty as a whole would reduce the 
confidence level of investors less than the application of the 
treaty in part.197  Provisional application imposes a large 
hurdle for an investor already facing years of complex 
arbitration, but it is the nature of complex international 
investment law and still in the interest of claimants to 
pursue. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
As noted in Part III, the Yukos Tribunal’s decision 
follows the existing case law and treaty law relating to 
provisional application.198  The issue of provisional 
application arises because of a lack of precision in the 
drafting of treaty language, sometimes purposeful and other 
times the result of lack of foresight.199 
In the aftermath of the Kardassopoulos decision, scholars 
suggested additions to the language of the ECT, specifically to 
Art. 45(1), that would have prevented the rise of disputes as 
occurred in Yukos.200  By reinforcing Art. 45(1) with language 
that clearly requires a signatory to make a declaration if 
provisional application is inconsistent with domestic 
regulations or to forego the domestic law defense to 
 194. Piotr Szwedo, Case Comment: (Former) Yukos v. Russian Federation 
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 18 J. INT’L COOPERATION STUDIES 
57, 62 (2010). 
 195. Belz, supra note 28, at 745. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Szwedo, supra note 194, at 62. 
 198. See supra Part III. 
 199. Belz, supra note 28, at 755. 
 200. See, e.g., id. 
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provisional application,201 the preliminary debate addressed 
by the Interim Yukos Award would not have been needed as 
the language of the treaty would have provided a clear 
answer. 
The ECT would also benefit from a clearer delineation of 
the duration of provisional application for countries like 
Belarus and Russia (prior to its withdrawal), which have 
signed but not ratified the ECT.202  In the aftermath of the 
Kardassopoulos decision, scholars proposed such language, 
and if this language had been present in the ECT at the time 
of the Yukos dispute, a substantial portion of the Tribunal’s 
decision would have been unnecessary.203  This language 
would resolve the indefiniteness of the ECT’s provisional 
application clauses and would “encourage states to either 
ratify or express their intent not to be bound by the treaty,”204 
the very problem that stimulated the Yukos dispute between 
ECT investors and Russia. 
A redraft of the treaty or amendments to its provisional 
application sections would give investors and host states a 
clearer picture of what is expected under the ECT’s use of 
provisional application.  Those changes would also guide 
future tribunals on the intent of the treaty’s drafters.205 
CONCLUSION 
The Tribunal’s decision is well-reasoned and supported 
by detailed scholarship.  Its conclusion that Russia must 
provisionally apply the ECT’s investor protection provisions is 
 201. See id. at 755–56 (suggesting that Article 45(1) be amended with the 
language: “If provisional application is inconsistent with a signatory’s 
constitution, laws, or regulations, that signatory must make a declaration upon 
signature rejecting provisional application pursuant to paragraph 2(a).  If the 
signatory fails to make this declaration upon signature, the signatory thereafter 
waives its rights to assert that provisional application is inconsistent with its 
constitution, laws, or regulations.”). 
 202. Id. at 759. 
 203. Id. (suggesting that an additional clause be added to Art. 45 with the 
language: “If after ___ years following the Treaty’s definitive entry into force a 
signatory provisionally applying the Treaty has not expressed its consent to be 
bound by the Treaty through ratification, acceptance, or approval, or voluntarily 
terminated its provisional application of the Treaty pursuant to Article ___, the 
signatory’s provisional application of the Treaty will terminate.”). 
 204. Id. 
 205. It is worth noting that it would be difficult to reach an agreement and 
possibly not worth the effort.  Before renegotiation began, the parties should 
examine the costs and potential benefits of clarification of the treaty’s terms. 
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in close accord with the plain text on provisional application 
in the treaty.206 
Regardless of the results of the merits phase of the 
arbitration, investors are more likely to focus on the political 
risk of investing in Russia after its treatment of Yukos and its 
subsequent withdrawal from the ECT.207  Even though the 
Yukos Tribunal afforded protection to prior investments 
continuing long after Russia’s withdrawal, it cannot extend 
this protection to new investments made in Russia after the 
withdrawal.208  Despite the risky climate for foreign 
investment in Russia’s energy sector, there are many 
opportunities for investment.209  To avoid future disputes 
related to multilateral investment treaties, treaties should be 
updated to address in detail the scope and limitations of 
provisional application.210 
The Tribunal’s Interim Award signals that Russia is no 
longer immune from the effects of the investment protection 
treaties it has signed.211  Allowing the Tribunal to move 
forward to the merits phase is an important step towards 
fairness in Russian investment disputes, and the release of 
the decision is a move towards transparency in Russian 
dispute settlements.212  However, despite an initial victory for 
the claimants, “it is already clear that complete victory for 
either the former Yukos owners or the Russian Federation is 
unlikely”213 because of the high cost of complex arbitration, 
 206. Giorgetti, supra note 125 (citing OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1238 (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (noting that 
affirmation of a treaty may mandate provisional application)). 
 207. Riley, supra note 184, at 38.  See also Daniel R. Sieck, Note, Confronting 
the Obsolescing Bargain: Transacting around Political Risk in Developing and 
Transitioning Economies through Renewable Energy Foreign Direct Investment, 
33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 319, 321–323 (2010) (“Political risk is an ever-
present danger of [foreign direct investment] that is especially profound in the 
energy sector . . . .  When investors operate in foreign legal regimes, they face an 
increased level of general business risk uncommon in domestic ventures.”). 
 208. See supra Part I. 
 209. Waltrip, supra note 1, at 586 (noting that capacity and technology 
updates needed by Russia will cost at least fifty billion dollars over the next ten 
years, and that the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources plans to encourage 
development of new oil fields and the creation of tax breaks for new exploration 
in encouragement of further development). 
 210. See Belz, supra note 28, at 759. 
 211. Rubins and Nazarov, supra note 57, at 113. 
 212. Niebruegge, supra note 4, at 375. 
 213. Golobolov and Tangega, supra note 106, at 647. 
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the small possibility of collecting a judgment from Russia, 
and the public relations disaster that has occurred for all 
parties.214 
Before the Tribunal’s decision in 2006, the Secretary 
General of the Energy Charter Secretariat, Andre Mernier, 
lamented the uncertainty of “the extent to which provisional 
application of the [ECT] creates firm legal rights and 
obligations for Russia . . . under international law.”215  The 
Yukos Tribunal clarified a great deal of that uncertainty, 
while the Yukos Interim Award will serve as a strong 
foundation for holding host nations accountable for protection 
of investments made during provisional application of the 
ECT; however, the addition of new, clear language with 
respect to provisional application would be the best 
foundation for preventing future disputes. 
 
 214. Id.  The tribunal has attracted much attention in the media, both for the 
exposure of what seems to be a Russian coup of the foreign energy 
infrastructure, and for the immense monetary amount of the claimants’ 
demand.  See Ross, supra note 121, at 11. 
 215. Andre Mernier, Sec’y Gen., Energy Charter Secretariat, Speech to the 
International Conference on Energy Security: the Energy Charter and 
International Energy Security, Moscow (Mar. 14, 2006), available at 
http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=59&id_article=75&L=0 (cited in Belz, 
supra note 28, at 729). 
